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I know now what he was trying to do, but Atticus was only a man. It takes a woman to 
do that kind of work. 
-SCOUT' 
13 
Empathy and Masculinity in Harper Lee's To Kill a Mockingbird 
RichardH !11.cAdams* 
AS DIFFICULT AS it is to say anything new about Harper Lee's To Kill aiVfockingbird, 
I will press my luck and offer two claims. My main thesis is that Mockingbird 
illustrates a troubled, two-sided relationship between lawyering and empathy.2 
Discussions of empathy conventionally address its pro-social aspect, the tendency 
for empathetic understanding to produce compassionate or altruistic behavior. Less 
frequently observed is the strategic value of empathy, the fact that a competitor who 
understands the thoughts and feelings of others is better able to anticipate an oppo-
nent's next move and stay one step ahead. Atticus Finch demonstrates both aspects 
of empathy: his ability to imagine the world from the perspective of others makes 
him a more compassionate and helpful father and neighbor, but also a more effective 
lawyer, better able to cross-examine adverse witnesses and to make arguments that 
(might) appeal to jurors. Atticus understands better than anyone else in Maycomb 
the tragic predicament of Mayella Ewell, but he uses his empathy to harm her, that 
is, to help his client Tom Robinson by exposing her as a liar. The irony is that the 
empathetic insight that makes Atticus the best person to cross-examine Mayella also 
makes him (among all those who believe she is lying) feel the most compassion for 
her. But the role of zealous advocate leaves limited room for showing compassion to 
one's adversary. 
My second thesis connects empathy to the theme of masculinity. The novel point-
edly offers anew version of white manhood in the Jim Crow South. The conventional 
white southern male of the 1930s romanticized the Lost Cause of the Confederacy 
and adhered to a strict code of chivalry that required the use of violence to assuage 
insults to honor, particularly the honor of white southern women. According to 
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this chivalric ideology, the greatest threat to white womanhood was black male pre-
dation, and the manly response was the lynching, not only of alleged black rapists 
but of other black men whose behavior seemed to question white supremacy. The 
novel offers Atticus as a male hero who rejects the white supremacist assumptions 
of lynching. Less obvious are the tools the novel uses to draw our attention to the 
concept of manhood and to invert its standard meaning. Atticus' courage is nonvio-
lent, which the novel contrasts with cowardly violence; Atticus fights for a lost cause 
that is not the Confederacy, but its victim; and Atticus acts valiantly by protecting 
an innocent black man from the accusation of a white woman. Southern chivalry is 
turned on its head. 
1he connection between these claims is that Atticus' heightened sense of empathy 
is one of the key ways in which he systematically violates period expectations for 
manliness. I begin with the general theme of manhood and then turn to the specific 
issue of empathy. 
I. DESTABILIZING AND RECONSTRUCTING 
JIM CROW MASCULINITY 
On a conventional view, manliness is a higher-order value such as strength. Atticus 
Finch is masculine in a straightforward way because he shows strength by confront-
ing a lynch mob and by defending Tom Robinson in court, despite the disapproval 
of his community. Yet in other obvious ways Atticus is unmanly because he lacks so 
many of the markers of manliness standard to his time. 
One should distinguish the inward quality of manliness, whatever it precisely is 
(e.g., strength, courage), from the masculine markers commonly taken as evidence 
of manliness. Upper body strength and emotional control are external markers; they 
are understood to correlate with manliness, but they are neither strictly necessary 
nor sufficient for it. TI1e markers are important, however, because they are more tan-
gible than the actual thing and are part of the everyday struggle to demonstrate man-
liness. As Michael Warner explains,3 the default setting for manliness is failure. The 
presumption being to the contrary, men have to prove that they are manly. And the 
value of a single demonstration decays over time, so that one must prove that one is 
still manly. Moreover, manliness is always contested; there are few avenues of defini-
tive proo£ And those that do exist-success in combat or life-and-death struggles 
with nature-are scarce for a modern man, especially if one cannot count on his 
past success to prove his manliness for the rest of his life. Given scarce opportuni-
ties, much of the social practice of manliness is focused on the display of masculine 
markers, which are sometimes confused for strength or whatever the ultimate char-
acteristic that manliness actually is. 
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However slippery the concept, we can identify some obvious markers of mascu-
linity for a 1930s white southerner. The striking fact is that Atticus lacks so many. He 
doesn't hunt. He doesn't fish, drink, or smoke. Atticus doesn't play poker or football 
(pp. 102-3). He comes directly home after work, sits in the living room and reads; 
we never hear of him bonding with other men. Atticus is gentle in ways that might 
be mistaken for weakness, particularly his avoidance of physical violence. He doesn't 
corporally punish his children (pp. 63, 100 ). He refuses to respond when Bob Ewell 
spits in his face (p. 248). Atticus is affectionate. Scout sits in his lap when he reads, 
which is presumably how she learned to read at such a young age that she can't 
remember not reading. And Scout says that Atticus and his brotl1er Jack "were the 
only two men she ever saw kiss each other" (p. 89). When members ofMaycomb's 
black community leave him presents of food after the trial, ''Atticus' eyes filled with, 
tears" (p. 244). 
The connection to manhood is explicit. When Miss Maudie's house is on fire, 
Scout and Jem observe that Atticus doesn't go up on a rooflike other men because he 
was "too old" and "might break his neck" (p. 80 ). Due to his age, "nearly fifty;' Scout 
describes Atticus as "feeble" and says that she and Jem felt that his being old, due to 
the fact that he started his family late, "reflected upon his abilities and his manliness" 
(p. 102). They feel they had nothing to say when other children told stories about 
their fathers because Atticus "didn't do anything;' by which Scout means that he did 
not have a manly occupation: "Atticus did not drive a dump-truck for the county, he 
was not the sheriff, he did not farm, work in a garage, or do anything that could possi-
bly arouse the admiration of anyone" (p. 102 ). "Besides that, he wore glasses" (p. 102 ). 
Atticus' glasses are a sign that he reads and writes for a living. And, of course, as a trial 
lawyer, he speaks for a living. Where "real men" are men of action, who quietly do 
things, Atticus is merely a man of words, apparently not much of a man at all. 4 
Of course, we don't have to wait for Atticus to stand up to a lynch mob in order 
for him to arouse the admiration of his children. In their eyes, he first proves himself 
with the incident of the rabid dog. When Calpurnia calls Atticus at work to warn 
him of a "mad" dog on the street, Atticus immediately drives over with the sheriff 
Heck Tate. Tate bears obvious masculine markers. He is a sheriff and that day he 
"wore boots with shiny metal eye-holes, boot pants and lumber jacket. His belt had 
a row of bullets sticking in it" (pp. 107-8). But when the time comes to shoot the 
dog, Tate asks Atticus to do the job. At the distance required, the shot is difficult 
and, though Scout and Jem have never seen Atticus fire a gun, it turns out that, "in 
his time;' he "was the deadest shot in Maycomb County" (p. ru). His children, espe-
cially Jem, are overwhelmed. The rabid dog story foreshadows the possibility that 
Atticus has hidden strength, that one can be manly even if one lacks the outward 
markers of manliness. 
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1he novel draws further attention to these markers with their unexpected pres-
ence in the unlady-like Scout. Scout disdains dresses in favor of overalls (p. 92). She 
plays with boys (Jem and Dill), cusses (p. 90 ), enjoys her air rifle Christmas present 
(p. 91), and likes to fight (passim!). On each occasion where she has the urge to 
fight, her intended or actual target is a boy: Jem, Dill, her classmates Walter and 
Cecil, and her cousin Francis. And Scout fights for real. When Francis baits her 
about Atticus, she "split[s] [her] knuckle to the bone on his front teeth" (p. 96). 
Even the nickname Scout suggests a military position, very much unlike her unused 
given name, Jean Louise. No wonder that Aunt Alexandra moves in with her 
brother Atticus so that she can provide a "feminine influence" for Scout (p. 145). 
Early in the novel, Jem frequently insults his sister for "acting like a girl," but later he 
seems to endorse Aunt Alexandra's plan, saying to Scout: "She's trying to make you 
a lady. Can't you take up sewin' or somethin'?" to which the eight-year-old replies 
"Hell no" (p. 257 ). 
The novel also pointedly refers to the (literal) construction of gender in the 
story of the snow person that Jem builds. Lacking enough snow for an ordinary 
snowman, he starts with a base of mud, to which he adds a thin coating of snow. 
Scout and Jem observe that the addition quickly changes the apparent race of 
the creation from black to white (p. 75). Jem then shapes the snow creature to 
look like the neighbor, Mr. Avery. 1he appearance is striking and unflattering. 
When Atticus arrives, he is amused but comments that it is "a near libel." "We've 
got to disguise it" (p. 76). Atticus suggests that Jem give the snowman a broom 
and apron-to make it a snowwoman-but Jem instead uses Miss Maudie's sun-
hat and hedge clippers. Miss Maudie is tickled at the transformation, but appar-
ently finds it to be less than completely successful. During her conversation with 
Atticus, Scout comically mishears Miss Maudie refer to the snow creature as 
"'.ln absolute morphodite" (p. 77 ), a term Scout repeats on two later occasions 
(pp. 84, 156).1 
There is nothing accidental here about the references to a hermaphrodite, the 
unmanliness of Atticus, and the masculine traits of Scout. By these details, the 
novel unsettles expectations about the markers and meanings of manliness, so it 
can reconstruct them into a new type of white southern hero. As I count them, 
that alternative construction involves three inversions of the Jim Crow code of 
white chivalry. 
First, southern white males conventionally embraced violence more than their 
northern and western white counterparts. This was obviously the case in the Jim 
Crow South, as white men used violence to enforce a white supremacist social order. 6 
But even long after the end of Jim Crow, social science finds that southern white 
men are more inclined than nonsouthern white men to use violence in response to 
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verbal insults and that southern institutions are more likely to excuse and forgive 
honor violence than are nonsouthern institutions. One wins an argument with fists, 
not words.7 
In the novel, however, we see violent responses to insults occur, not by the male 
hero but in two other characters: Scout and Bob Ewell. Scout's violence is obviously 
unmanly because it is childish. In the story, growing up involves Scout's learning 
to control her violent impulses. Bob's most violent outburst occurs when he tries 
to murder Jem and Scout, in retaliation for being humiliated (along with Mayella 
Ewell) by Atticus' cross-examination during the trial of Tom Robinson. But this 
attempted "honor" killing of children is obviously a supreme act of cowardice. 1here 
is also, of course, the attempted violence of the lynch mob that go to the jail, seek-
ing to kill Tom, to defend the honor of Mayella. Yet that mob, which Atticus calls 
a "gang of wild animals" (p. 179 ), is also discredited in various ways by the story, 
including the apparent fact of Tom's innocence and the fact that it could be so easily 
shamed by Scout. 
By contrast, Atticus refuses to respond to a most outrageous insult when Bob 
"cursed him, spat on him, and threatened to ldll him" (p. 248). Bob's wbacco-ladcn 
spittle landed on Atticus' face. This is exactly the kind of provocatory act that would, 
in the period, have easily led to lethal violence (and was probably intended to so do). 
Because Atticus uses words as a weapon, we might not have expected him to respond 
with violence in any event. But he also holds his tongue against Bob, expressing none 
of the outrage he must have felt. Out of context, his restraint might seem cowardly. 
But by the time of the spitting incident, Atticus has already shown extraordinary 
courage by defending Tom against the law and the mob, both without the use of 
physical violence. Tirns, his restraint demonstrates enormous self-control. And we 
believe him when he later tells Jem that he wanted to let Bob have the last word, and 
to feel he had gained back his honor, so as to save Mayella or some other Ewell child 
from "one extra beating" (p. 249 ). Thus, again, Atticus is manly for sacrificing for the 
sake of someone weaker than himself. 
Which brings us to the second point: Jim Crow masculinity embraced a south-
ern code of chivalry that contemplated white men protecting white women from 
black predation. TI1is was the ideology of lynching. As Arthur Raper explains in 
his 1933 study, "Regardless of the cause of a particular lynching, there were always 
those who defended it by the insistence that unless Negroes were lynched, no white 
woman would be safe."8 In 1930, Jessie Daniel Ames, a white woman, founded the 
Association of Southern Women for the Prevention of Lynching precisely because 
she thought it vital that the supposed beneficiaries of lynching attack this central 
chivalric justification.9 But Ames was the exception. In the novel, Scout hears white 
women express this sexual fear of black men and the need for protection. Outside 
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the courthouse, Scout overhears a white woman say "[I]t's time somebody taught 
'em a lesson, they were getting' way above themselves, an' the next thing they think 
they can do is marry us" (p. 283). At a meeting of her aunt's missionary circle, 
another white woman expresses the fear that "there's no lady safe in her bed these 
nights" (p. 265). 
Mayella makes a direct appeal to chivalry at the end of her testimony against Tom. 
Atticus has frustrated her by exposing various weaknesses and inconsistencies in her 
account, so she stops talking about the facts and challenges the masculinity of the 
white male jurors: 
"I got somethin' to say an' then I ain't gonna say no more. 1hat nigger yonder 
took advantage of me an' if you fine fancy gentlemen don't wanta do nothin' 
about it then you're all yellow stinkin' cowards, stinkin' cowards, the lot of you. 
Your fancy airs don't come to nothin'-your ma'amin' and Miss Mayellerin' 
don't come to nothin: Mr. Finch." 
She says to the jurors, in effect, if they want to be like Atticus, they can pretend to be 
men, but they are really cowards. 
Yet Atticus is clearly the opposite of a "yellow stinkin' coward[]." He is the novel's 
hero, even though he explicitly rejects this central aspect of southern chivalry by 
defending Tom against Mayella's accusation. As I explain in greater detail below, he 
defends Tom by verbally attacking Mayella on cross-examination, seeking to expose 
her as a liar. 
1hird, southern men at tl1e time notoriously romanticized the antebellum 
South and revered the Confederacy's war against the North as the great Lost 
Cause: "During the Civil War, Southern Spokesmen had hailed Johnny Reb for his 
devotion to ideals, his courage in battle, and his endurance of hardship. So pervasive 
~as this eulogistic ideology that it not only survived defeat but actually increased 
its emotional appeal." 10 One sign of this reverence was the many Civil War monu-
ments in the South, honoring Southern soldiers. The peak years for unveiling these 
monuments occurred in the first two decades of the twentieth century," just before 
the events in the novel. 
Atticus also embraces the idea of a lost cause, but it is not for the Confederacy. 
At one point, he tells Jem why he wanted him to spend time with the elderly Mrs. 
Dubose, to observe her break herself of her morphine addiction before dying: "I 
wanted you to see what real courage is, instead of getting the idea that courage is a 
man with a gun in his hand. It's when you know you're licked before you begin but 
you begin anyway and you see it through no matter what" (p. 128). 1he passage also 
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describes Atticus' own lost cause, which is his fight for Tom Robinson. He explains 
to Scout: "Simply because we were licked a hundred years before we started is no 
reason for us not to try to win" (p. 87 ). 
The connection between this lost cause and the Confederate one is made explicit 
when Scout replies, "You sound like Cousin Ike Finch." Scout explains that Ike is 
"Maycomb County's sole surviving confederate veteran. He wore a General Hood 
type beard of which he was inordinately vain." When they would visit him once 
a year, 
Jem and I would listen respectfully to Atticus and Cousin Ike rehash the war. 
"Tell you, Atticus;' Cousin Ike would say, "the Missouri Compromise was what 
licked us, but ifI had to go through it agin I'd walk every step of the way there 
an' every step back just like I did before an' furthermore we'd whip 'em this 
time .... " (p. 87) 
As if he can undo the past, Ike refuses to quit despite the fact that the war is 
over, which is exactly parallel to Atticus's statement: "Simply because we were 
licked ... before we started" is no reason to give up. Southern chivalry demanded 
fighting for the underdog, and in some sense the ultimate underdog is one who 
has already lost. Yet, in Tom Robinson, Atticus champions the lost cause of an 
even bigger underdog, one that the Confederacy and the Jim Crow caste system 
stand against. 
In these three respects, the novel offers a transformation of the markers of south-
ern manliness into a new kind of hero: instead of the white man who violently 
protects white women from black predation and glories in the Lost Cause of the 
Confederacy, Atticus fights without violence for the lost cause of Tom Robinson, 
seeking to defend a black man from white predation rooted in the Confederacy. 
Stating the point in terms of chivalry identifies why the novel is less comfortable 
today: it valorizes the privileged white man who protects the helpless black man. 
Modern readers may understandably prefer a sweeping rejection of chivalry and a 
celebration of the heroic African Americans who stood up for their own civil rights, 
but the novel, set in small-town Alabama of 1935, offers a more limited transforma-
tion that was plausible in that time and place. Given the power of Jim Crow norms 
at this time, the novel offers not even a modest success but a heroic failure, in that 
Tom dies despite Atticus's efforts. 
These three twists on white Jim Crow manliness seem fairly straightforward. But 
for the rest of this essay, I want to address a fourth and less obvious way the novel 
reconstructs manliness: by the strength of empathy in Atticus. 
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II. LAWYERING AND EMPATHY 
Empathy is conventionally coded as a trait of womanhood. Social scientists and 
biologists debate the point, but some see evidence that woman are on average more 
empathetic than men; others claim that men and women are equally empathetic 
but that men are on average better able to disengage their empathetic concern or 
compassion for rivals and adversaries. 1' Yet if we attend more carefully to empathy, 
we shall see that it has different elements, only one of which is feminine. In multiple 
characters but especially in Atticus, To Kill a .Nfockingbird explores types of empathy 
and draws our attention to their potentially dual role in lawyering. 
TI1e novel most directly refers to the gendered nature of empathy in the quotation 
that begins this essay. At one point, Aunt Alexandra is horrified to find that Jem and 
Scout have no special regard for the significance of their family origins. Jem has been 
lightheartedly discussing an embarrassing cousin Joshua, a sewer inspector, who was 
locked up for trying to shoot the president and thereby cost the family five hun-
dred dollars, presumably in legal expenses (p. 150 ). The implication is that Joshua 
was perhaps not fully sane. Aunt Alexandra has a talk with Atticus, who that night 
stops by Jem's bedroom, with Scout present, to deliver a stern message. Fidgeting, 
he says: "Your aunt has asked me to try and impress upon you and Jean Louise that 
you are not from run-of-the-mill people" and that she plans to speak to them about 
their family history "so you'll have some idea of who you are, so you might be moved 
to behave accordingly" (p. 151). Fidgeting as well, Scout runs the teeth of a comb 
against the edge of a dresser and Atticus curtly says "Stop that noise." At this point 
Scout begins to cry. 
Eight-year-old children ofi:en cry without serious reason, and Scout does not ver-
balize any reason. As a narrator, however, she explains: "111is was not my father. My 
father never thought these thoughts. My father never spoke so." 111ough she does 
· not speak, Atticus is able to grasp her thoughts and feelings and realizes that her 
disturbance is deep, that he has shaken her understanding of who her father is. So 
he abandons his sister's project and countermands his order, telling his children to 
"Forget it" (p. 152.). He leaves the bedroom and then briefly returns to joke: "Get 
more like cousin Joshua every day, don't I? Do you think I'll end up costing the fam-
ily five hundred dollars?" Scout then reports: "I know now what he was trying to do, 
but Atticus was only a man. It takes a woman to do that kind of work." 
TI1e passage is not easy to interpret precisely. I read "that kind of work" to refer to 
the emotional work that parents do to raise children. Part of the work is to under-
stand the thoughts and feelings of children, who cannot clearly express them. This 
is the work of empathy, which turns out to be a key theme of the novel. And it 
turns out that Atticus and other men in the novel are frequently quite competent at 
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empathetic understanding of others. They frequently do "that kind of work." Before 
exploring the empathy theme in To Kill a Mockingbird, and its role in lawyering, 
I discuss the meaning of empathy. 
A. Two Aspects of Cognitive Empathy 
To say that empathy is feminine is too simple. Daniel Batson recently distinguished 
eight uses of the term empathy in the psychology literature. '3 For my purposes, 
I draw on a simpler two-part distinction he makes. Batson says that researchers use 
the eight concepts of empathy to answer two questions: (1) "How can one know 
what another person is thinking and feeling?" And (i.) "What leads one person to 
respond with sensitivity and care to the suffering of another?"14 1he answer to both 
of these questions is empathy, but not the same kind of empathy. 
The first question poses a cognitive issue and directs our attention to what may 
be called cognitive empathy. In some sense, cognitive empathy is mind reading.' 5 
One theory is that humans have a remarkable capacity to use a "theory of mind" to 
discover the thoughts and emotions occurring in another mind. Another theory is 
emotional contagion, in which an animal has the capacity to mirror the emotions 
of another (perhaps by first mimicking their outward behavior), and then to use 
introspection to infer what emotional state the other person must have. Humans 
probably have both sources of cognitive empathy, but it is clear that part of what 
lawyers or any strategic game player does is the former: to reason consciously about 
how the other person is reasoning and thereby to infer their thoughts and emotions. 
By contrast, the second question raises not a cognitive but an emotional 
issue: What thoughts and emotions might cause an individual to engage in altruistic 
behavior? The question directs our attention to what might be called empathetic con-
cern, an emotional engagement with another person that triggers concern when the 
other is in distress. Batson's major thesis is that empathetic concern explains altru-
ism, particularly behavior aimed at alleviating distress. Whether or not that is true, 
I simply want to distinguish the two dimensions of empathy, and to further distin-
guish these types of empathy from the behavior they might (or might not) produce. 
In a typical case, (1) cognitive empathy allows someone to recognize and understand 
another person's psychic suffering, which might produce (i.) empathetic concern for 
their suffering, which might produce (3) compassionate behavior. But the connec-
tion between these three steps is at most a mere tendency, not a necessity. 
Focus on (1) and (i.). The empathy we code as feminine is the emotion of empa-
thetic concern, while the insights of cognitive empathy are presumably masculine. 
Initially, note how they are conceptually distinct. Cognitive empathy need not lead 
to empathetic concern; the sadist might use cognitive empathy to understand better 
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how to inflict psychic harm on a person. And empathetic concern might arise with-
out cognitive empathy. A might not be capable, on his own, of inferring B's thoughts 
and feelings, but if B informs A of her suffering, A may take the report at face value 
and feel concerned for B. Nonetheless, cognitive empathy frequently leads to empa-
thetic concern and empathetic concern may prompt the greater use of one's imagina-
tion-greater effort-to generate cognitive empathy. 
Now consider the relationship between the first two mental steps and compas-
sionate behavior. Even if A (r) cognitively understands and (i.) feels empathetic 
concern for B, that knowledge and emotion might fail to produce (3) compassion-
ate behavior. Most obviously, if there are other motives pushing against the choice 
of compassion, A may disregard his empathy for B. Indeed, not only can a person 
ignore the target of his cognitive empathy, but cognitive empathy can also make it pos-
sible to do a person greater harm. If you want to strategically manipulate or control 
adversaries, it helps a lot to understand their thoughts and feelings, so that you can 
anticipate their next move and stay one step ahead. 
Some people find this claim so jarring that they object to the use of term "empa-
thy" in this manner, even when qualified as "cognitive empathy." Yet there is noth-
ing original in my using "empathy" to refer to the human ability to read the minds 
of other humans. Martha Nussbaum vividly made this point by discussing empathy 
with the example of a torturer, who we can imagine is better able to inflict pain 
and terror by understanding his victim's perspective.16 More generally, she notes that 
"enemies often become adept at reading the purposes of their foes and manipulat-
ing them for their own ends." This is also true in competitive games. Psychologist 
Paul Bloom uses the example of poker players: "Those who win the World Series 
[of Poker] are superb mindreaders. As [player Al] Alvarez says, 'One of the many 
gifts that separates the professionals from the amateurs is the ability to read their 
opponent's hands with uncanny accuracy from the tiniest clues: timing, position, 
the way their fingers move their chips or their eyes flicker, even the pulse beat in 
their neck.' "17 
The idea that empathy is feminine does not apply to cognitive empathy. Poker, 
for example, is a masculine activity. One wants to understand one's opponents so as 
to defeat them; this does not entail that one feels concern for taking their money. 
(One could feel such concern, but that would be a reason not to play the game, or 
not to win.) 
As a third example of this distinction, consider the strategic advantage that cogni-
tive empathy gives to police when they interrogate suspects. Interrogation is also a 
masculine activity. As in poker,.cognitive empathy helps the interrogator catch the 
suspect psychologically off-guard. A well-timed, dramatic revelation of an accusa-
tion may cause the unprepared guilty suspect to react involuntarily, with a blush or 
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stammer, after which she gives up and confesses. The interrogator will have a better 
sense of how to time the revelation if she has a sense of the suspect's state of mind, 
which requires cognitive empathy. · 
There are also less obvious reasons the interrogator gains from taking the suspects' 
perspective. Police interrogation manuals recommend the technique of "moral 
minimization;' where the detective proposes to the suspect a moral excuse for com-
mitting the crime, one that lessens its moral wrongfulness, so as to make it easier to 
confess.'8 One manual, the "Reid Technique;' recommends: "Sympathize with the 
Suspect by Saying that Anyone Else Under Similar Conditions or Circumstances 
Might Have Done the Same Thing .... [T]he solicitations of a sympathetic inves-
tigator may allow the suspect to believe that if the investigator can understand the 
reasons for his or her crime, others may also be understanding."19 Yet one can readily. 
see that this technique depends on understanding the suspect well enough to offer 
rationalizations that he will find convincing-perhaps the very rationalizations he 
already used to justify his crime to himself-because the suspect might correctly 
identify unconvincing rationalizations as clumsy efforts to manipulate him. 
A more surprising advantage to cognitive empathy in interrogations is that empa-
thetic police know they can sometimes succeed by an appeal to the conscience of the 
suspect. One of the most famous interrogations in Supreme Court law involved the 
"Christian burial speech" from Brewer v. U/illiams. 20 On the day afi:er Christmas, 
police arrested Williams for the murder of a ten-year old girl, Pamela Powers, who 
disappeared the day before Christmas. Police had not found the girl's body and it 
had begun to snow, which promised to make its recovery more difficult, perhaps 
impossible. During a long car ride back to the jurisdiction of the disappearance, a 
police detective, Leaming, attempted to interrogate Williams without his counsel 
being present. This was a rare opportunity, but Williams was resistant to speak-
ing. The detective had to select one of a number of possible interrogation strategies 
for the situation. After taldng a "read" of his suspect, Leaming sought to appeal to 
Williams' religious beliefs. In a rhetorically skillful speech, the detective asked that 
he allow the parents to give their daughter a "decent Christian burial;' rather than 
leave the body out in the elements. It worked; Williams led the police to the body. "1 
Another example is Rhode Island v. Innis.,. Police there had arrested a man for 
murdering a cab driver with a shotgun. 1hey suspected that he had hidden the shot-
gun in the area of a school for disabled children, but Innis had asserted his Miranda 
rights at the scene of the arrest, so the police could not interrogate him. So they tried 
something else. While several police officers were in a car with Innis transporting 
him to the stationhouse, one officer said to another something like: "[I]t would be 
too bad if ... a girl-would pick up the gun, maybe ldll hersel£"03 Hearing this, Innis 
spoke up and revealed where the shotgun was. 
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In both cases, a capacity for cognitive empathy assists the police in their strate-
gic manipulation of their suspect. Innis is particularly interesting because the legal 
question was whether the police tactic of speaking in the presence of the suspect, 
without actually addressing him, counted as "interrogation." If it did, then it vio-
lated Miranda. The Supreme Court thought that it depended on whether the police 
"should have known" their words or actions "were reasonably likely to elicit an 
incriminating response."l4 Under that standard, the Court decided that these words 
were not interrogation. 
When I've taught the case (elsewhere than at my current institution), some stu-
dents agreed with the Court's conclusion by offering this reason: the police could 
not possibly have predicted that a man capable of murdering a cab driver with a shot-
gun for money would have cared that the gun he hid might injure a child. Whatever 
the right answer to the legal question, this particular rationale shows a basic failure 
of cognitive empathy. TI1e world is not populated only by those who follow con-
ventional morality and those who follow no morality; it includes violent men who 
follow their own moral code, a common feature of which is greater acceptance of 
stranger violence toward men than toward women or children (domestic violence 
is another matter). The police in these cases had more cognitive imagination than 
these particular students; the cognitive empathy here allowed them to succeed in 
interrogating the guilty. 
B. M.ile Empathy in To Kill a Mockingbird 
To Kill a lvfockingbird shows us both compassionate and strategic uses of cognitive 
empathy. Although it is not surprising that the novel shows a man-Atticus-mak-
ing strategic use of empathy, it also shows a variety of men whose empathetic con-
cern motivates compassionate behavior, "that kind of work" ordinarily associated 
with women. Just as Atticus works at being both a father and a mother to this chil-
dren (with Calpurnia's assistance), he exhibits both masculine and feminine forms 
of empathy. 
To begin, Atticus tries to teach Scout empathy. One of the famous lines of the 
novel is when Atticus says: "[I]f you can learn a simple trick, Scout, you'll get along a 
lot better with all kinds of folks. You never really understand a person until you con-
sider things from his point of view ... until you climb into his skin and walk around 
in it" (p. 33). Scout and Atticus refer back to this idea of perspective taking at various 
points. At one point when Jem is uncommunicative, Scout comments: "As Atticus 
had once advised me to do, I tried to climb into Jem's skin and walk around in it" 
(p. 65). In this case, she comes to understand that she would also be quiet if she were 
in his position (having just had a frightening encounter at the Radley house) and so 
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she leaves him alone. WhenJem asks Atticus why he did not respond to Bob Ewell's 
provocation-the spit in the face-Atticus replies: "Jem, see if you can stand in Bob 
Ewell's shoes a minute" (p. 249). Atticus explains that he destroyed Bob's credibility 
at the trial, so he had ro have some kind of "comeback;' some victory, to get even. 
Atticus would rather that Bob's victory be spitting in Atticus' face than beating one 
of the Ewell children. The metaphor of "walking in another's shoes" (or skin) gets a 
final reference I discuss below. 
Atticus' empathy generally motivates compassionate and altruistic behavior. As 
I've already indicated, with the passage leading up to Scout's statement "It takes a 
woman to do that kind of work;' he is an empathetic and caring parent who under-
stands his children well. There are many other examples of compassionate parenting, 
but Atticus' empathy also extends outside his family. When Scout brings home ~er 
classmate Walter Cunningham, Jr., who is awkward in this wealthier environment, 
Atticus understands the boy sufficiently that they can converse like "two men talk-
ing about crops" (pp. 26-27 ), though Atticus is not a farmer. He is compassionate 
toward the Radley family when he tries at various points to reign in his children's 
interest in Boo to prevent them from causing the family anxiety. He is compassion-
ate toward his elderly neighbor Mrs. Dubose by helping her end a morphine addic-
tion before she dies (in part, by sendingJem to read to her). The list goes on.'1 
Other men also show important instances of empathy-based compassion. 
Boo Radley, who appears to be mentally challenged, exhibits some impressive 
empathy-based reasoning. One night,Jem, Scout, and Dill prowl around the Radley 
house only to run away in panic when they are discovered. Jem gets his pants caught 
and torn in a fence, and so he pulls out of them. Later, he goes back to retrieve the 
pants and discovers them neatly folded over the fence with the torn part resewn. 
When he tells Scout, "Jem shudder[s]" and says "Like somebody was readin' my 
mind ... like somebody could tell what I was gonna do. Can't anybody tell what I'm 
gonna do lest they know me, can they, Scout?" (p. 66). But of course a refined sense 
of cognitive empathy is a kind of mind reading. Boo does this again during the fire 
that burns Miss Maudie's house. Because it not safe to stay inside the nearby houses, 
Jem and Scout are standing outside in the cold near the Radley house, watching the 
men fight the fire across the street. Apparently, Boo divines that they are uncomfort-
ably cold, because he unobtrusively walks up behind them and puts a blanket on 
their shoulders (pp. 80-82). 
Tom Robinson is compassionate toward Mayella (if we believe his testimony). 
He walks past her house almost every day and he stops on many occasions to render 
some service because he recognizes that she's overwhelmed: "Seemed like every time 
I passed by yonder she'd have some little somethin' for me to do-choppin' kind-
lin: totin' water for her .... Mr. Ewell didn't seem to help her none, and neither did 
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the chillum" (p. 218). Jem also shows empathy-based compassion in various ways. 
Perhaps the most striking example is when, late in the novel, he asks Scout not to kill 
an insect, a "roly-poly;' because "they don't bother you" (p. 273). This causes Scout 
to comment: "Jem was the one who was getting more like a girl every day, not I;' 
raising again the notion that empathy and compassion are feminine while locating 
it in men. 
The theme of empathy is so important to the novel that all of the key events, by 
my count, can be seen as involving the dramatic use or failure of cognitive empathy. 
One such instance occurs when Atticus stands up to the lynch mob that has come 
to the jail to take Tom. 1he appearance of Scout, Jem, and Dill does not immedi-
ately defuse the situation, but it eventually does so when Scout recognizes Walter 
Cunningham, Sr., and asks him to pass on her regards to his son, Walter, Jr. Scout 
does not understand why, but it causes the mob to break up. The next day, Atticus 
explains, again using his empathy metaphor: "you children last night made Walter 
Cunningham stand in my shoes for a minute. That was enough" (p. 179 ). 1he indi-
viduals in the mob obviously lack (cognitive or emotional) empathy for Tom, but 
their empathy for Atticus is sufficient. Scout's mention of the child Walter must 
have at least made the father Walter Cunningham take the perspective of Atticus, 
who had to be terrified at the fact that his children were standing in the middle of 
a lynch mob. 
Now consider two pivotal failures of empathy. First is the central encounter 
between Tom and Mayella, the day he stops by the house and Mayella winds up 
accusing him of rape. According to Tom's testimony, Mayella attempted and failed 
to seduce him. Despite Tom's compassion for her, at the critical moment he does 
not understand her well enough to divine her intentions. If he had, he would no 
doubt have never agreed to enter her house, and that would have saved his life. In 
r~turn, Mayella does not understand Tom well enough to anticipate his rejection 
of her, or she would never have invited him into her house. On the witness stand, 
Tom recounts a particular part of the misunderstanding. He asks Mayella where her 
siblings are and she explains that she had saved money for a year to send them to 
town for ice cream. Tom testifies that he then said: "why Miss Mayella, that's right 
smart o'you to treat 'em. An' she said, 'You think so?'" (p. 220 ). Tom comments to 
Atticus "I don't think she understood what I was thinkin' -I meant it was smart of 
her to save like that, an' nice of her to treat 'em.'" Atticus replies: "I understand you, 
Tom. Go on." 1he point is, however, that at the time, Mayella did not understand. 
She thought Tom was complimenting her on de':ising a way for the two of them to 
be alone. 
1he last major event in the book is Bob Ewell's attempted murder of Scout and 
Jem, and here everyone, including Atticus, is guilty of an epic failure of cognitive 
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empathy. Atticus cannot imagine that Bob would attack his children, or he would 
never have let them walk alone in the dark to the school pageant. The failure is 
explicit. When Aunt Alexandra previously expressed a concern about Bob, Atticus 
replies, "What on earth could Ewelt do to me, sister?" (p. i.50 ). When Atticus first 
learns of the attack onJem, he says he can't "conceive" of anyone "low-down enough 
to do a thing like this" (p. 305). And when he learns the perpetrator is Bob, he repeats 
that he "can't conceive of a man who'd" do such a thing (p. 308). Yet we can forgive 
this lapse in cognitive empathy. It is not inconsistent with my general claim that he 
possesses a powerful empathetic imagination because the behavior Atticus failed to 
anticipate is so shocking and rare. Atticus correctly understood that Bob was the 
sort of man who must have some kind of satisfaction for his courtroom humiliation 
and understood that without this satisfaction he might take it out on children. He 
simply never imagined that Bob's misplaced and cowardly violence might incl~de 
murdering Scout and Jem. 
So I have described the role of empathy-its dramatic presence or absence-
in three key events: Atticus' successful confrontation of the lynch mob; the 
Mayella-Tom encounter that led to the rape accusation; and Bob's attempted mur-
der of Scout and Jem. Now let us turn to the other major event of the novel, the 
trial. Here we see the other side of empathy. Atticus' perspective taking is useful for 
anticipating and controlling strategic adversaries, as by extracting information they 
do not want to give away. 
C. 1he Cross-Examination oJMaye!la Ewell 
Atticus does a more effective job of cross-examining Mayella Ewell because of his 
understanding of her and her tragic predicament. His cognitive empathy allows him 
to grasp more precisely Mayella's motivation for falsely accusing Tom of rape, which 
allows him to ask the relevant questions to expose that motivation to the jury. As we 
shall see, his empathy is double-edged because it also makes him more aware of the 
suffering he inflicts on Mayella by doing his job. 
The starting point is a question that has been insufficiently examined in the criti-
cal literature: What does Atticus know about Mayella? Every novel challenges the 
reader to use empathy to fill in the gaps the author leaves (intentionally or unin-
tentionally) in the description of the characters' thoughts and feelings, but a novel 
like To Kill a Mockingbird goes two steps farther. First, we receive the story from an 
unreliable narrator, the eight-year-old Scout, whose limitations place extra interpre-
tive demands on the reader. 26 An unreliable narrator creates an especially strong invi-
tation to use imaginative empathy to fill the gaps in the child's understanding of the 
events. Second, the story gives us a theme of empathy and a powerfully empathetic 
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character in Atticus. So it is particularly important to ask what obscure elements 
in the story come to light if we follow Atticus in exercising our cognitive empathy. 
What does he know that Scout doesn't? Or what does the adult Scout now realize, 
decades later, that she did not know at the time? 
Once we set aside the happenstance that Scout is the one telling us the story, the 
first thing to notice is the centrality of an event that does not include her. The origi-
nal cause of the other key events is the encounter between Mayella Ewell and Tom 
Robinson that leads her to accuse him of rape. Because the event occurs "off stage;' 
the novel forces us to imagine them, as the trial forces the jurors to imagine them. 
If Tom is guilty, the event is an all-too-common rape and we can easily understand 
why he lies about the matter and his lies tell us nothing about Mayella. But if Tom 
is telling the truth-the conventional understanding of the story-then the result is 
that Mayella and the event are more complex.'7 Why did she risk so much by flout-
ing the racial taboo of her community? Having been attracted to Tom, why does she 
now accuse him of a capital crime (as rape was in Alabama at this time)? Although 
the child Scout doesn't even ask these questions, I read Tom's testimony as providing 
just enough detail for us to answer them. Seeing things from Mayella's perspective 
shows how the event is more momentous and tragic than Scout understands it to be. 
The first thing Atticus and perhaps everyone in Maycomb know about Mayella is 
her misery. Her mother died when she was young (like Scout), leaving her to cope 
with a vile and violent father (unlike Scout). Bob Ewell spends much of the family 
welfare check on alcohol. The Ewells live near the town dump, which they scour 
every day for things of value. Mayella is the oldest sibling and must work hard to 
care for her five to eight siblings (p. 194).'8 The only one of these siblings we meet 
is Burris Ewell, at the first day Scout goes to school, where his parting words to his 
teacher are, "Ain't no snot-nosed slut of a schoolteacher ever born c'n make me do 
nothin'!" (p. 31). Thus, we can understand why Mayella thinks that Atticus mocks 
her in his cross-examination when he uses polite terms such "ma'am" and "Miss" 
(p. 2.06). It is unlikely that any males in her family ever show her that kind of respect. 
On top of this, it appears that her father, Bob, physically abuses Mayella. And 
there is some reason to think that the abuse includes incest. When Tom describes 
their encounter, he says that Mayella said to him that she had "never kissed a grown 
man before .... She says what her papa do to hei· don't count" (p. 2.2.I; emphasis 
added). The ominous words "to her" in this sentence seem to accuse Bob, but even 
if the sentence omitted them, there are other grounds for suspicion. Bob seems an 
unlikely source of affectionate fatherly kisses. When the prosecutor asks him on 
the witness stand the simple question, '"Are you the father of Mayella Ewell?'" his 
immediate answer is unsentimental and insinuating:" 'Well, ifI ain't I can't do noth-
ing about it now, her ma's dead'" (p. 195). It also seems odd that Mayella would even 
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contemplate her father's kisses during her encounter with Tom, much less feel the 
need to distinguish them from the passionate kisses she is asking Tom for, unless 
there was something sexual about them. We know from Atticus that the Maycomb 
authorities do not always require the Ewells to obey laws they enforce against every-
one else (p. 34). Although the specific examples mentioned are only truancy and 
poaching, Miss Maudie reminds us at one point: "The things that happen to people 
we never really know. What happens in houses behind closed doors, what secrets" 
(p. 51)."9 1hough some commentators think the incest is obvious,30 I regard the issue 
as not definitively settled, one of the horrors "we never really know." My point is that 
the grounds for suspicion would not escape the attention of Atticus. He understands 
the situation as well as it can be understood by an outsider. 
There is a second fact Atticus knows about Mayella. A person in her situation 
could easily be resigned to her fate, but she is-before the final encounter with 
Tom-resilient and hopeful. We get a hint of this when we learn of her geraniums. 
The area around the Ewell cabin is littered with junk gleaned from the dump, such 
a large assortment of broken and rusted items that it made the yard "look like the 
playhouse of an insane child" (p. 194). But there is one exception that "bewildered 
Maycomb." In one corner, "[a]gainst the fence, in a line, were six chipped-enamel 
slop jars holding brilliant red geraniums, cared for as tenderly as if they belonged to 
Miss Maudie Atkinson ... People said they were Mayella Ewell's" (p. 194). Tom tells 
us: "She watered them red flowers every day-" (p. :u8). A person who had given up 
hope would presumably not bother to create a small thing of beauty in such an ugly 
setting, not when she is barely eking out a life. Somehow Mayella has not, before 
the last encounter with Tom, let her poverty, ignorance, and abuse overwhelm and 
defeat her. 
More astonishing is the self-possessed, hopeful way that she acts on her attraction 
to Tom (according to his testimony). She is not daunted by the monumental barri-
ers of the Jim Crow racial taboo and Tom's married status. She cannot successfully 
seduce Tom under the watchful eyes of her siblings, so Mayella starts by hatching 
a plan. She saves enough money so that, on the day she will ask Tom inside, she 
can first send all her siblings into town to get ice cream. Here is a pertinent fact 
that slips in through the testimony of Tom: it takes her an entire year. "She says, 
'Took me a slap year to save seb'm nickels, but I done it" (p. 22.0 ). Surely, it required 
extraordinary patience and sacrifice on her part-during the Great Depression-to 
save money. And to keep her father from discovering what she was up to because 
Bob Ewell would never have let her keep any money she saved, even if he did not 
discover the illicit purpose. In context, this hope and patience is particularly strik-
ing. A stereotype of rhe poor is that they are lazy and impulsive. Mayella is obviously 
neither. Surely, there were many temptations to spend the money along the way, but 
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she resisted them all. And many victims of domestic battering are overwhelmed by 
the apparent omnipotence of their batterer; they become passive and helpless. Yet 
again Mayella is assertive and proactive. 
So we arrive at the day when Mayella put her daring plan into motion. Atticus obvi-
ously discussed with Tom the details of his encounter with Mayella. We see his prep-
aration in his direct examination of his client. In preparing his cross-examination, 
he would have asked himself why Mayella did what she did. Inevitably, he would 
have imagined the day from her perspective, walked around in her skin. ~te prob-
ably, Atticus realized that some point in this day was, and would always remain, the 
happiest moment of Mayella Ewell's life. Perhaps it occurred when her siblings first 
departed for ice cream, leaving her alone in a strangely quiet home. Maybe it was the 
moment when Tom first appeared on the road, proving that she had not wasted the 
hard-earned seven nickels just given to her siblings to get them out of the way. Or 
possibly it was when Tom accepted her invitation to enter the house, or when she 
hugged and kissed him, the first time she kissed a man other than her father, the first 
time she wanted to. While things were moving according to plan, Mayella must have 
felt an unfamiliar and exhilarating sense of control of her life. 
For Atticus, the paragon of empathy, it could not have escaped him that, at this 
point, the two worst possible things that could happen to Mayella did happen. First, 
Tom rejects her. The only man ever to show her respect, a good-looking, slightly 
older man whose kindness she thought reflected romantic interest, utterly spurns 
her advance. Ironically, the same racial norms that encouraged him to show respect 
and kindness to Mayella, thus prompting her attraction, compelled him to avoid her 
advance. (Not that we can assume he wanted to reciprocate; like Mayella, we have no 
good reason to think he was attracted to her.) 
Second, as Tom rejects her, Bob Ewell appears at the window. Tom says that Bob 
called her a "goddamn whore" and threatened her life (p. :1.21). She will have no 
se~ual interlude with Tom, but her father will beat her as if she had. She will live 
in the worst of both worlds, being punished for something she had wanted but 
never obtained. If her nine-year-old brother Burris is willing to call his teacher a 
slut at school, one can imagine the kind of taunting Mayella must endure from her 
brother(s) and father, especially when Bob is drunk and especially if he has been 
sexually abusing her. After Tom runs off, the beating Bob gives her is surely not the 
last to be inspired by the embrace he saw. 
For Mayella, these events are annihilating. Mockingbird is a story of how racism 
kills Tom Robinson, but there is a parallel story of the death of Mayella's hope and 
resilience. She risked everything and lost. Of course, none of this justifies her falsely 
accusing Tom of rape. But imagining her story at least makes her lie less of a puz-
zle. First, it is not difficult to imagine Bob conceiving the sadistic plan to punish 
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Mayella and Tom by forcing her to be an instrument in his destruction. Second, 
however wrongful, Mayella cannot stand to see the man who rejected and humili-
ated her walk by her house every day for the rest of her life. Having been spurned by 
a low-status black man, she agrees to call in her one status claim as a white woman, 
which is to be believed when she accuses a black man of rape. Of course, even that 
claim fails, despite the jury's conviction, because it appears later that many of the 
white people in Maycomb did not believe her. And that is largely because of the 
cross-examination by Atticus. 
The cross-examination is effective in several respects. I want to draw attention to 
one narrow part it, when Atticus poses a simple question that only someone who 
imagines Mayella's life would ask. "'Miss Mayella; said Atticus ... 'a nineteen-year-old 
girl like you must have friends. Who are your .friends?'" (p. 208; emphasis add~d). 
Following the standard advice, Atticus doesn't ask this question without knowing 
the answer. He knows the answer is that she has no friends, which is why Mayella 
responds only with: "Friends?" Atticus tries again: "Yes, don't you know anyone 
near your age, or older, or younger? Boys and girls? Just ordinary friends?" This time 
her hostility "flared again" and she replies: "You makin' fun o'me agin, Mr. Finch?" 
(p. 208). Having empathized with her life, Atticus lrnows that this fact helps to 
explain the desperation of her behavior, why she would risk so much on the fantasy 
that Tom was sexually interested in her. Showing the jury her desperation would 
therefore make Tom's story more credible. 
So this is the lawyer's job: in front of the whole town turned out to watch the 
trial, to ask a friendless person the devastating question, "Who are your friends?" To 
expose to everyone that this impoverished, uneducated, overworked, beaten, pos-
sibly sexually abused person lacks any romantic partner or ordinary friend. No won-
der that Scout reports: "When Atticus turned away from Mayella he looked like his 
stomach hurt" (p. 213). And later: 
Somehow, Atticus had hit her hard in a way that was not clear to me, but it gave 
him no pleasure to do so. He sat with his head down, and I never saw anybody 
glare at anyone with the hatred Mayella showed when she left the stand and 
walked by Atticus's table. (p. 214) 
A few critics have inferred from his actions that Atticus is indifferent to Mayella's 
suffering, perhaps out of class blindness.31 But I am inclined to say that he is not that 
lucky. If one's role as a fawyer requires that one harm an adverse witness by exposing 
the person's failings, it would be professionally fortunate not to feel the pain one 
is inflicting. If one must ask a pitiless question, it would be easier if one is genu-
inely without pity, like the poker player who feels no concern for the people whose 
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money he wins. But that does not describe Atticus. Given his combination of cogni-
tive empathy and empathetic concern, he is the single person in the courtroom who 
is most likely to fully grasp Mayella's misery and desperation, to understand why she 
misinterpreted Tom's kindness as sexual interest, and to imagine how she was utterly 
destroyed by his rejection. 
This is the conundrum of the trial lawyer. Having cognitive empathy will make 
one a better lawyer because it will allow one to get inside the head of adversaries 
(witnesses and opposing counsel). But for the decent and compassionate lawyer, 
the job will often require suppression of the empathetic concern one's cognition 
inspires. In legal combat, the lawyer's empathetic imagination is sometimes just a 
tool for attack, damaging a person who, he may believe, deserves compassion. And 
this is the conundrum of Atticus: there is no way to defend Tom Robinson except 
to be merciless on the woman whose testimony threatens to send him to the electric 
chair. As Atticus says to his sister, he is "in favor of Southern womanhood as much as 
anybody, but not for preserving polite fiction at the expense of human life" (p. 167 ). 
As he tells the jury: "I have nothing but pity in my heart for the chief witness for 
the state, but my pity does not extend so far as to her putting a man's life at stake" 
(p. 231).12 So he exposes Mayella as a liar, a violator of the racist and sexual taboos of 
her community, and a failure rejected by the black man she seeks to seduce. 
* * * * * 
Let me conclude by connecting this empathy theme back to the manliness thesis. 
The final part of Harper Lee's reconstructed masculinity, the final inversion of 
southern chivalry, is that Atticus not only refuses to take the side of white woman-
hood against a black man but also actively harms a particular white woman. The last 
part of his heroism is his willingness to "man up" to do this unpleasant, lawyering 
job despite this knowledge and despite his inclination for compassion. This is what 
ma~es Scout's description of the cross-examination so significant. With room for 
the hypocrisy of domestic violence, it was considered cowardly, and contrary to chiv-
alry, for a man to hit a woman. Yet Atticus' cross-examination of Mayella "hit her 
hard" and was heroic for doing so. The irony is that it is his empathetic insight into 
Mayella that allows him to hit her as hard as he does. 
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